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Constitutional Sex Discrimination* 
 
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Lisa Baldez, & Tasina 
Nitzschke Nihiser** 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Nearly thirty years have elapsed since the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided Craig v. Boren, a landmark case in the 
Court’s constitutional sex discrimination jurisprudence.  In 
Craig, the justices pronounced that they would apply 
neither the lowest level of scrutiny—rational basis—nor the 
highest level—strict scrutiny—to evaluate claims of sex 
                                                 
* Please send all correspondence to Lee Epstein. Email: 
epstein@artsci.wustl.edu; Post: Department of Political Science, 
Washington University, CB 1063, 1 Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 
63130. 
** Lee Epstein is the Edward Mallinckrodt Distinguished University 
Professor of Political Science and Professor of Law at Washington 
University; Andrew D. Martin is Assistant Professor of Political 
Science at Washington University; Lisa Baldez is Associate Professor 
of Government at Dartmouth College; Tasina Nitzschke Nihiser is a 
Ph.D. student at Washington University. We are grateful to the 
National Science Foundation, the Center for New Institutional Social 
Science, the Washington University School of Law, and the 
Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy, 
for supporting our research. We also owe thanks to participants in 
Washington University’s Workshop on Empirical Research in the Law 
(“WERL”), Susan Appleton, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Nancy Staudt for 
offering many useful suggestions; and to Scott Friedman, David 
Lewarchik, Shelby Johnston, and Peter Ryan for outstanding research 
assistance. We used R, SPSS, and Stata to conduct the analyses 
presented in this paper. The project’s web site 
(http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html) houses a full 
replication archive, including a database containing all the cases and 
variables we used in this study, as well as the documentation necessary 
to reproduce our results. 
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discrimination. Rather, the Court invoked a standard “in 
between” the two, now known as intermediate or 
heightened scrutiny.  Under this approach, the Court asks 
whether a law challenged on equal protection grounds is 
substantially related to the achievement of an important 
objective. 
Certainly the Craig Court’s intermediate approach has 
its supporters; indeed, influential legal scholars are now 
advocating that courts adopt it to evaluate laws 
discriminating against gays and lesbians.  But to many 
analysts, Craig (and its progeny) was and remains highly 
problematic.  Among their claims is that the standard it 
instantiated is so “loose” and “amorphous” that it produces 
unpredictable results. 
In this article, we seek to bring some empirical teeth to 
this debate by exploring patterns in sex discrimination 
litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court and in state courts of 
last resort.  Our chief finding is that the critics of 
heightened scrutiny probably have the better case.  At the 
very least, the Craig standard—while generating outcomes 
more favorable to parties alleging sex discrimination than 
did the traditional rational basis test—does, in fact, lead to 
far less predictable results than either rational basis or strict 
scrutiny.  For reasons that may have little to do with the 
standard itself, courts are just as likely to uphold sex-based 
classifications as they are to eradicate them. 
This finding has important implications for the future of 
sex discrimination litigation, as well as for the 
advancement of legal rights for gays and lesbians.  As to 
the former, our results underscore the importance of 
elevating the standard used to adjudicate sex discrimination 
claims—a goal, as we demonstrate, that could be achieved 
in several distinct ways.  As to gays and lesbians, our 
findings identify the possible costs and benefits associated 
with a litigation strategy designed to place their claims of 
discrimination in the intermediate scrutiny basket. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Nearly thirty years have elapsed since the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided Craig v. Boren,1 a landmark in its 
constitutional sex discrimination jurisprudence.2  In Craig, 
                                                 
1 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
2 Id.  We follow Mary Anne Case, Constitutional Sex Discrimination: 
The Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 
1447 (2000) and “use the term ‘sex discrimination’ to refer to 
discrimination between males and females.”  The vast majority of 
Supreme Court inquiries into denials of equal protection on grounds of 
sex—our chief concern in this Article—have focused on this type of 
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the justices pronounced that they would apply neither the 
lowest level of scrutiny—rational basis—nor the highest 
level— strict scrutiny—to evaluate claims of sex 
discrimination.3 Rather, they would invoke a standard “in 
between” the two, now known as intermediate or 
heightened scrutiny.  Under this approach, the Court asks 
whether a law challenged on equal protection grounds is 
substantially related to the achievement of an important 
                                                                                                 
discrimination, that is, “on deprivations caused by rules that, on their 
face, distinguish between males and females.” Id.  
3 Since we provide more details about these levels of scrutiny  in Part 
II, suffice it to note here that prior to Craig, the Court invoked a two-
tier approach to equal protection claims. Under this model, the Justices  
 
upheld legislation so long as it was rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental purpose, unless that legislation 
impinged upon a “fundamental right” or classified on the 
basis of a “suspect trait” like race or ethnicity.  Where a 
law employed a “suspect classification” or restricted the 
exercise of a “fundamental right,” the Court applied “strict 
scrutiny,” requiring that the government establish that the 
legislation was necessary to a compelling governmental 
objective and that no less restrictive alternative was 
available. 
Peter S. Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review:  Has the United 
States Supreme Court Adopted a “Sliding Scale” Approach Toward 
Equal Protection Jurisprudence? , 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475, 477 (1997).  
See also LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE (2004); 
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2003); SUSAN G. 
MEZEY, ELUSIVE EQUALITY (2003); Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. 
INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender 
Classifications, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185 (2003); Michael C. Dorf, The 
Paths to Legal Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 791 (2002); Gerald Gunther, 
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1971); Risa 
E. Kaufman, State ERAs in the New Era: Securing Poor Women’s 
Equality by Eliminating Reproductive-Based Discrimination, 24 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 191 (2001). 
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objective.4 
Since Craig, the Court has tinkered with this “in-
between” standard.  Most notably, in United States v. 
Virginia (the “VMI case”)5 it seemed to “ratchet up” 
Craig,6 stating that it would require an “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” to sustain a sex-based 
classification.7  Tinkering, as it turns out, is the operative 
word.  Despite the speculation of some commentators,8 and 
                                                 
4 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
5 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
6 Martha C. Daughtrey, Women and the Constitution, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 21 (2000) (suggesting that in VMI, “Justice Ginsburg ratcheted 
up the already ‘heightened scrutiny’ another notch or two.”);  see also 
Dorf, supra note 3 (claiming that “United States v. Virginia arguably 
ratcheted up the level of judicial scrutiny applicable to sex 
classifications from intermediate to nearly strict.”);  infra notes 8 and 9. 
7 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (“Parties who seek to 
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 
‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action.  Today’s skeptical 
scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex 
responds to volumes of history.”).  Some trace this language back to 
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) and 
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994).  See, e.g., 
Smith, supra note 3 at n.17 (asserting that “in recent gender 
discrimination challenges, the Court has applied a super-heightened 
scrutiny to equal protection challenges.  The language for this 
redefinition of intermediate review derives from Hogan (requiring that 
gender-based governmental action demonstrate an ‘exceedingly 
persuasive justification.’).”); see also David K. Bowsher, Cracking the 
Code of United States v. Virginia, 48 DUKE L.J. 305, 320 (1998); Jason 
M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action under United 
States v. Virginia’s “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 
86 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (1998); Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: 
Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimination in Nguyen v. INS, 
12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 222, 228 (2003).   
8 As Heather L. Stobaugh notes:  
 
Over the years, commentators have argued that Justice 
Ginsburg’s use of “skeptical scrutiny” and her heavy 
reliance on the “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
language in the majority opinion of Virginia introduced a 
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even Court members,9 United States v. Virginia has hardly 
generated a sea-change in the Court’s approach to sex 
discrimination.  In fact, in its most recent forays into the 
area the majority of the Court backed off Virginia,10 
                                                                                                 
stricter test into cases involving gender-based 
classifications as opposed to the traditional level of 
intermediate scrutiny established in Craig v. Boren.  
Heather L. Stobaugh, The Aftermath of United States v. Virginia, 55 
SMU L. REV. 1755, 1755 (2002).  For commentary illustrating 
Stobaugh’s claim, see, e.g., Steven A. Delchin, United States v. 
Virginia and Our Evolving “Constitution”: Playing Peek-a-boo with 
the Standard of Scrutiny for Sex-Based Classifications, 47 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV 1121, 1134 (1997) (arguing that “VMI may be the 
instrument for establishing strict scrutiny”); Cass Sunstein, Foreword: 
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 73 (1996). 
9 For example, in his dissent in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 
574, Justice Scalia accused the majority of “a de facto abandonment of 
. . . intermediate scrutiny.”  See also Daughtrey, supra note 6, at 22, 
who writes that “in an address to the University of Virginia School of 
Law shortly after the VMI decision was announced, [Justice Ginsburg 
said,] ‘There is no practical difference between what has evolved and 
the ERA.’” 
10 Since VMI, the Court has decided two cases mounting constitutional 
challenges to sex-based classifications, Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 
(1998) and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).  In both, it upheld the 
classification and invoked the specter of Craig, rather than VMI, in the 
process.  As to Miller, the majority wrote, “[e]ven if, as petitioner and 
her amici argue, the heightened scrutiny that normally governs gender 
discrimination claims applied in this context, we are persuaded that the 
requirement imposed by §1409(a)(4) on children of unmarried male, 
but not female, citizens is substantially related to important 
governmental objectives.”  Miller, 523 U.S. at 434 n. 11 (citation 
omitted).  Many scholars argue that this language “cannot be squared 
with . . . Court doctrine prohibiting sex-based classifications that are 
not supported by ‘exceedingly persuasive justifications’.”  Cornelia T. 
L. Pillard and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary 
Power, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1998).  See also Kristin Collins, When 
Fathers’ Rights are Mothers’ Duties, 109 YALE L. J. 1669 (2002); 
Emily J. Gelhaus, The New Lower Standard for Equal Protection 
Claims Concerning Gender, 71 U. CIN. L. REV 305.  As to Nguyen, the 
Court’s majority claimed that “[f]or a gender-based classification to 
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1] 
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retreating to the familiar territory of Craig.11  “The message 
of United States v. Virginia,” turned out to be “no different 
from Craig: gender classifications are subject to 
                                                                                                 
withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established ‘at least that 
the [challenged] classification serves important governmental 
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’”  Nguyen, 
533 U.S. at 60.  Because the Court once again relied on the standard 
articulated in Craig rather than the standard of VMI and Nguyen, many 
scholars argue that this represented “a marked shift away from the 
Court’s gender-based equal protection analysis set forth in Virginia.”  
Stobaugh, supra note 8, at 1756.  See also Dorf, supra note 3, at n. 93 
(suggesting that while “United States v. Virginia arguably ratcheted up 
the level of judicial scrutiny . . . Nguyen . . . ratcheted it back down.”).  
Stobaugh speculates that this “retreat” from Virginia occurred because 
 
five Justices united to pull in the reins on the use of the 
“exceedingly persuasive justification,” which they believe 
imposes a higher level of scrutiny on gender-based 
classifications under Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion. 
In other words, five Justices saw this area of the Court’s 
jurisprudence moving in a direction they did not 
support—toward treating gender as a suspect class—and 
they used Nguyen to prevent that result. 
Stobaugh, supra note 8 at 1757. 
11 See Weinrib, supra note 7, at 227 (stating that “in light of the 
landmark anti-discriminatory outcome of United States v. Virginia . . . 
the apparent retreat in Nguyen came to many as an unpleasant 
surprise.”); Stobaugh, supra note 8, at 1756 (noting that “[d]espite such 
scholarly speculation about Virginia’s positive impact on future 
gender-based equal protection claims, it now appears not enough 
weight was given to those Justices who had expressed a strong dislike 
for the ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ language and had 
disapproved of Justice Ginsburg’s heavy reliance on it.”); Bowsher, 
supra note 7, at 318 (“The Court has repeatedly applied the standard 
expressed in Craig without any further changes to the message.”).  Also 
worth noting are Bowsher’s findings, at 306-07, that “[o]f the six 
federal Courts of Appeals that have considered whether United States v. 
Virginia heightened the standard of scrutiny, five have concluded that it 
did not.”  
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1] 
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intermediate scrutiny.”12 
 Certainly Craig’s intermediate approach has its 
supporters;13 influential legal scholars are now advocating 
that courts adopt it to evaluate laws discriminating against 
gays and lesbians.14  But to many analysts, Craig (and its 
                                                 
12 Bowsher, supra note 7, at 320.  But see Edward M. Gaffney, Curious 
Chiasma , 4 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 394, 396-97 (2002) (claiming that “if 
the formal language of the standard used to evaluate claims of gender 
discrimination is not strict scrutiny, it is something very close to that 
sort of exacting review.  It rarely meets a classification that it likes . . . . 
From Hoyt v. Florida to United States v. Virginia, the movement in the 
protection of gender equality has been from low to high, from toothless 
irrationality to de facto strict scrutiny.”). 
13 See, e.g., Bowsher, supra note 7, at 317-18 (arguing that “despite the 
objections of three members of the Craig Court, intermediate scrutiny 
has since proven to be very workable.” ); Collin O’Connor Udell, 
Signaling A New Direction in Gender Classification Scrutiny, 29 
CONN. L. REV. 521, 548 (1996) (claiming that “from a feminist 
perspective, the intermediate scrutiny standard was certainly preferable 
to the ‘mere rationality’ formulation,” but also asserting that “we can 
do better [than Craig].”); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 
718, 724 n.9 (1982) (“when a classification expressly discriminates on 
the basis of gender, the analysis and level of scrutiny . . . does not vary 
simply because the objective appears acceptable to individual Members 
of the Court.”). 
14 Some commentators urge the application of heightened scrutiny to 
laws that discriminate between homosexuals and heterosexuals, that is, 
these analysts “seek to garner intermediate scrutiny for gays as gays.” 
Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for 
Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753.  See, e.g., Ann 
Shalleck, Revisiting Equality: Feminist Thought About Intermediate 
Scrutiny, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 31 (1997) (“As in the struggle for 
women’s equality, heightened constitutional scrutiny matters both 
symbolically and practically in the movement for gay and lesbian 
rights.”); Yoshino, at 1756 (“In the near future, the United States 
Supreme Court is likely to consider the argument that gays should 
receive heightened scrutiny . . . The main purpose of this Article is to 
strengthen [that] argument.”)  Another group of commentators suggest 
that discrimination against gays and lesbians is, in fact, discrimination 
on the basis of sex. Hence, courts should apply the same level of 
scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation as they do for 
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1] 
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progeny) was and remains highly problematic.  Among 
their claims is that the standard it instantiated is so 
“loose”15 and “amorphous"16 that it produces unpredictable 
results17—so much so that it was “only a partial victory in 
women’s rights advocates’ campaign for equality.”18 
In this article we seek to bring some empirical teeth 
to this debate by exploring patterns in sex discrimination 
litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court and in state courts of 
last resort.19  Our chief finding is that the critics of 
                                                                                                 
laws that discriminate on the basis of sex.  See Andrew Koppelman, 
Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, 
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 
187.  See also Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 45, 81 (1996) (stating that an “equality-based argument against 
antigay policies is that such policies constitute gender discrimination     
. . . . When one is barred from entering into a marriage with a same-sex 
partner who satisfies all other legal criteria of marriage eligibility, then 
one has been denied a marriage license solely because of sex. This 
triggers intermediate scrutiny.”); Andrea L. Clausen, Marriage of 
Same-Sex Couples in Iowa, 6 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 451, 461 
(2002) (“[I]f the Iowa Supreme Court were to recognize denial of 
same-sex marriage as a sex-based claim, but did not want to classify 
sex as a suspect class, the court could use intermediate scrutiny.”); 
SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM (1988).  See 
also infra Part IV.  For commentary advocating the use of intermediate 
scrutiny in other areas, see Rosemary M. Kennedy, The Treatment of 
Women Prisoners after the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 
65 (1997) and Tamra M. Boyd, Keeping the Constitution’s Promise: An 
Argument for Greater Judicial Scrutiny of Federal Alienage 
Classifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 319 (2001). 
15 Justice David Souter, quoted in Skaggs, supra note 7, at 1190. 
16 Joan A. Lukey and Jeffrey A. Smagula, Do We Still Need a Federal 
Equal Rights Amendment?, 44 BOSTON BAR J. 10, 26 (2000). 
17 See also, John Galotto, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, via Croson, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 508, 545 (1993) (writing that the “standard is chafing 
at the Court and [unconvincing] to most scholars.”). 
18 Shalleck, supra note 14, at 33. 
19 In Part III, we explain why we focus on state courts of last resort 
rather than on the lower federal bench.  Suffice it to note here that 
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heightened scrutiny probably have the better case.  At the 
very least, the Craig standard—while generating outcomes 
more favorable to parties alleging sex discrimination than 
did the traditional rational basis test—does, in fact, lead to 
far less predictable results than either rational basis or strict 
scrutiny.  Courts are, for reasons that may have little to do 
with the standard itself, just as likely to uphold sex-based 
classifications as they are to eradicate them. 
This finding has important implications for the 
future of sex discrimination litigation, as well as for the 
advancement of legal rights for gays and lesbians.  As to 
the former, our results underscore the importance of 
elevating the standard used to adjudicate sex discrimination 
claims—a goal, as we demonstrate, that could be achieved 
in several distinct ways.  As to gays and lesbians, our 
findings identify the possible costs and benefits associated 
with a litigation strategy designed to place their claims of 
discrimination in the intermediate scrutiny basket.20 
We arrive at these implications in three steps.  We 
begin in Part II with a description of the three-tier approach 
federal courts use to analyze claims of discrimination under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, 
along with a long-standing critique of that approach—that 
it leads, especially in the mid-level tier, to indeterminate 
results.  In Part III, we demonstrate that this critique has 
merit.  In particular, we show that while the application of 
the lowest and highest standards does, in fact, lead to rather 
predictable outcomes, the “in-between” standard does not.  
This result leads us in Part IV to emphasize the importance 
of elevating sex to the highest level of scrutiny and to 
question efforts designed to treat discrimination against 
gays and lesbians as sex discrimination—at least until 
                                                                                                 
because all three levels of scrutiny have been used in these courts to 
adjudicate claims of constitutional sex discrimination, they provide 
excellent laboratories for exploring patterns in this area of the law. 
20 See supra note 14 and infra Part IV B. 
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courts move away from Craig’s in-between test. 
 
II.  Equal Protection and the Supreme Court 
 
To say that the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence has generated its fair share of commentary 
over the past few years is to make a rather uncontroversial 
claim.  In fact, in the wake of recent decisions in the areas 
of sex discrimination,21 affirmative action,22 and gay 
rights,23 scholars have scrutinized virtually every aspect of 
the Justices’ approach to classifications based on sex, race, 
sexual orientation, and the like.24  We do not intend to 
review the range of commentary, which would require a 
book or two.  Instead we have two objectives.  First, since 
an appreciation of current debates over Craig and its 
progeny requires some knowledge of the Court’s three-tier 
approach to equal protection, we provide a brief overview 
of it in Part II A.  Not much more is necessary since it has 
been so well described elsewhere.25  Second, since we 
explicitly seek to put the debate on firmer empirical 
ground, we identify in Part II B the chief claims of both 
proponents and opponents of the Court’s jurisprudence, 
first with regard to the determinancy of the results yielded 
by the current three-tier approach, and then with particular 
emphasis on its application to sex discrimination. 
 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
22 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244 (2003). 
23 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), reh’g denied, 124 S.Ct. 35 
(2003). 
24 For a recent and particularly insightful analysis, see Robert C. Post, 
Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and 
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003). 
25 For a sampling of work, see supra note 3.  
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A.  The Three-Tier Approach to Equal Protection 
 
To analyze claims of discrimination under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,26 
judges, at least until Craig, applied one of two standards.27  
Under the traditional rational basis test, as Table 1 shows, 
courts presume the validity of whatever classification the 
government has made (e.g., allowing only those over the 
age of 18 to enter into contracts, or permitting only M.D.s 
to perform surgery); it is up to the party challenging the law 
to establish that it is irrational.  Since this burden is difficult 
to meet, the conventional view among scholarly 
commentators is that rational basis leads to a predictable 
outcome: courts defer to the government, generally 
upholding its classification.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
restricted to the states; the governing constitutional provision for claims 
of discrimination against the federal government is the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  For purposes of our discussion on sex 
discrimination, the two clauses are interchangeable. 
27 We adopt and adapt some of the discussion in this Part from Lee 
Epstein et al., Do We Still Need an ERA? at 
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/ERA.html. 
28 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3; MEZEY, supra note 3; 
Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A 
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L. J. 871 
(1971); Gunther, supra note 3; Kaufman, supra note 3.  As we 
foreshadowed in Part I, some contemporary commentators take issue 
with this prediction. 
For their views, see Part II B. 
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Table 1. Equal protection tests29 
 
 
 
 
Until the 1970s, the vast majority of claims of 
discrimination proceeded under the rules of the traditional 
rational basis test—with one particularly relevant  
exception: race.  In light of the history surrounding 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has 
held that classifications based on race should be subject to a 
less surmountable standard, known as “strict scrutiny” (or 
“suspect class”).30  Under this standard, judges presume 
that a government action is suspect or unconstitutional.  
Only by showing that the law is the least restrictive means 
available to achieve a compelling state interest can the 
government overcome that presumption (see Table 1).  
Given the difficulty of making this showing, a conventional 
                                                 
29 EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 645.  See also supra note 3 and 
infra note 89. 
30 See supporting citations  supra note 3. 
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wisdom emerged: the application of strict scrutiny 
generally leads to outcomes just as predictable as those 
under rational basis—only, of course, in the opposite 
direction: when courts apply this stricter test, they almost 
always rule in favor of the party alleging discrimination.  
Or, as Gunther famously put it, the suspect class test is 
“‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact,” whereas the traditional 
rational basis standard provides “minimal scrutiny in theory 
and virtually none in fact.”31 
It is thus no wonder that as part of their attempt to 
eradicate discrimination, women’s rights groups, beginning 
in the late 1960s, attempted to convince courts that sex-
based classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny 
rather than to a rational basis analysis.32  Their litigation 
efforts did not succeed, but neither did they wholly fail.  In 
response to their claims, the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig 
v. Boren33 articulated a new standard, often called 
intermediate or heightened scrutiny, that falls somewhere 
between rational basis and strict scrutiny.34  Under it, the 
                                                 
31 Gunther, supra note 3, at 8.  Justice O’Connor has taken issue with 
this claim, asserting strict scrutiny is not always “strict in theory, but 
fatal in fact.”  Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2338.  Some scholars agree, arguing 
more broadly, as we do in Part II B, that the standard three-tier 
approach fails to produce reliable expectations.  Nonetheless, it is true 
that many contemporary commentators suggest that Gunther’s assertion 
remains generally apt.  See, e.g., EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3; 
MEZEY, supra note 3; Farber et al., supra note 3; Lukey, supra note 16.  
See also Part III for our attempt to empirically evaluate this debate. 
32 For descriptions of these efforts, see generally Daughtrey, supra note 
6; Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Beyond Legislative Lobbying: 
Women’s Rights Groups and the Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 134 
(1983). 
33 Craig, 429 U.S. at 218. 
34 For a history of the litigation leading up to Craig, including the 
Court’s decisions in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, 
THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Daughtrey, supra note 6; 
Gaffney, supra note 12; Weinrib, supra note 7. 
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challenged law must be substantially related to the 
achievement of an important government objective (see 
Table 1).35 
Many argue that application of intermediate 
scrutiny leads to more favorable outcomes for parties 
alleging sex discrimination than did the traditional 
standard.36 At the same time, though, they suggest that the 
intermediate approach, as opposed to rational basis or strict 
scrutiny, produces far less predictable results: the Court 
may more often than not void sex-based classifications, but 
it more than occasionally upholds them.37 
 
B.  Assessments of the Three-Tier Approach 
 
As we noted at the onset of this section, no shortage 
of critical commentary exists on the Court’s three-tier 
approach to equal protection.  Some comes from the bench 
itself, such as Justice Stevens’s statement that “there is only 
one Equal Protection Clause.  It requires every State to 
govern impartially.  It does not direct the courts to apply 
                                                 
35 As we explained in Part I, in United States v. Virginia, the majority 
articulated a variation on this approach which would require an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” to sustain a sex-based 
classification.  See supra note 7.  But in its two most recent cases the 
Court “retreated” to the standard articulated in Craig.  See supra note 
10. 
36 See, e.g., Udell, supra note 13 (noting that “from a feminist 
perspective, the intermediate scrutiny standard was certainly preferable 
to the ‘mere rationality’ formulation”).  See also LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, 
CONTEMPORARY CASES IN WOMEN’S RIGHTS (1994); Case, supra note 
2. 
37 See, e.g., MEZEY, supra note 3; Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect 
Class:  An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny to Gender 
Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953 (1996); Erin Chlopak, 
Mandatory Motherhood and Frustrated Fatherhood:  The Supreme 
Court’s Preservation of Gender Discrimination in American 
Citizenship, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 967 (2002); Deutsch, supra note 3; 
Lukey, supra note 16. 
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one standard of review in some cases and a different 
standard in other cases.”38 There are numerous critics of the 
heightened scrutiny standard in particular.  Mary Ann Case, 
for example, asserts that “the components” of the 
intermediate standard “have rarely been the moving parts in 
a Supreme Court sex discrimination decision,”39 whereas 
Jason Skaggs points out the inconsistency of “subject[ing] 
gender-based affirmative action programs to strict scrutiny 
while analyzing all other gender-based classifications under 
intermediate scrutiny.”40 
These scholars make interesting and useful points. 
Especially relevant for our project, though, are analyses 
centering on the reliability of the results yielded by the 
three-tier approach.41 The issue raised in these analyses—
                                                 
38 Craig, 429 U.S. at 211-12. Justice Stevens was responding to a 
potential critique of the now three-tiered, as opposed to the traditional 
two-tiered, approach. As he goes on to say: “Whatever criticism may be 
leveled at a judicial opinion implying that there are at least three such 
standards applies with the same force to a double standard.” 
39 Case, supra note 2, at 1449.  Rather, she says, “to determine whether 
there is unconstitutional sex discrimination, one need generally ask 
only two questions: 1) Is the rule or practice at issue sex-respecting, 
that is to say, does it distinguish on its face between males and 
females? and 2) Does the sex-respecting rule rely on a stereotype?” 
40 Skaggs, supra note 7, at 1174-75.  For other critiques, see Shalleck, 
supra note 14 (strict-scrutiny standard as applied to gender issues also 
important for gay and lesbian rights); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Miller v. 
Albright: Problems of Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79 B.U. L. 
REV. 1139 (1999).  For more general commentary on the Court’s 
jurisprudential posture toward women’s rights, see JUDITH A. BAER, 
OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST 
JURISPRUDENCE (1999) (suggesting that it has worked to reinforce male 
dominance). 
41 See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference , 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 83 (2002):  
 
Reliability, [in empirical research], is the extent to 
which it is possible to replicate a measurement, 
reproducing the same value (regardless of whether it 
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whether various legal standards produce predictable and 
consistent outcomes—is important for many reasons, not 
the least of which is the implication for the norm of stare 
decisis.  If courts decline to follow precedential rules of law 
or do so in unpredictable ways, they risk undermining their 
fundamental efficacy.  Members of the legal and political 
communities predicate future expectations on the 
assumption that others will follow existing rules. Should 
courts make radical changes or apply rules inconsistently, 
these communities may be left unable to adapt.42 
From this general logic emerge two specific 
critiques of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.  
One, which has emerged in recent years, suggests that a 
three-tier approach no longer provides an adequate 
framework for reliable expectations about court decisions; 
the other, a more conventional view we previewed in Part 
                                                                                                 
is the right one) on the same standard for the same 
subject at the same time. If any one of us stepped on 
the same bathroom scale 100 times in a row, and if 
the scale [was] working properly, it would give us the 
same weight 100 times in a row—even if that weight 
is not accurate. (In contrast, a scale that is both 
reliable and valid will give a reading that is both the 
same and accurate 100 times in a row.)  In other 
words, in empirical research we deem a measure 
reliable when it produces the same results repeatedly 
regardless of who or what is actually doing the 
measuring.   
Id.  This, it seems to us, is very similar to the criteria many 
commentators use to evaluate the predictability of legal 
standards. 
42 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, supra note 34; Jack Knight & 
Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018. It is 
along similar lines that scholars are concerned with reliability.  They 
suggest that unreliable measurement procedures might provide 
evidence that the researcher, however inadvertently, has biased a 
measure in favor of a personal hypothesis, which can then undermine 
any inferences reached therein. See Epstein & King, supra note 41, at 
83.  
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IIA, asserts that while intermediate scrutiny may be 
relatively unpredictable, the two lowest and highest tiers 
are not.  As a general matter, the application of rational 
basis leads courts to uphold classifications and the 
application of strict scrutiny leads courts to strike them 
down. 
Those who believe that the standard equal 
protection framework no longer produces uniform results 
(if, in fact, it ever did) do so for various reasons.  For 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, the problem is that the “the Court has 
failed to develop any coherent framework regarding how, 
in applying the tiers of scrutiny, courts are to assess 
whether the governmental interest asserted satisfies the 
requirements of the level of scrutiny at issue.”43  In Robert 
Post’s view, the Court can circumvent the three-tier 
approach altogether by strategically avoiding (even 
obvious) equal protection argume nts.44  The commonalities 
among these and other critiques, however,45may be more 
                                                 
43 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests:  
Equal Protection Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 260, 270 (2002). 
44 Post, supra note 24, at 99-101. He specifically points to Lawrence v. 
Texas, 124 S. Ct. 441 (2003), in which passages in the majority’s 
opinion “sound almost entirely in equal protection,” but which the 
Court decided on due process grounds.  Id. at 99.  Post argues that the 
justices took this route to avoid determining “whether classifications 
based upon sexual orientation should receive elevated scrutiny or 
merely rational basis review.”  Id. at 100.  Such strategic 
“instrumentation” on the part of judges seems to occur in other areas of 
the law, in other forms, and for a range of reasons. See Lee Epstein et 
al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the Supreme Court:  An Empirical 
Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2002); Emerson H. Tiller & 
Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political 
Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 362 (1999). 
45 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 3, at 476 (asserting “[t]he Rehnquist 
Court is moving away from [a three-tiered scheme of review] toward a 
more flexible approach.  Moreover, even under the three-tier 
framework, the Court balances the importance of the rights or interests 
at stake with the government’s justification for the discriminatory 
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interesting than their differences.  Broadly speaking, the 
argument advanced in study after study of judicial 
decisions is that although institutions—including legal 
standards—are certainly important, they are not as 
determinative as the three-tier framework might suggest.  
Indeed, the extant literature typically defines an institution 
as a set of rules that structures an interaction,46 not as rules 
that establish outcome.  Furthermore, it typically views the 
choices judges make as a function of many other forces, 
including personal political preferences, jurisprudential 
values, personal attributes, and the external environment in 
which they deliberate.47 
There are multiple examples within the equal 
protection realm that demonstrate the inadequacy of the 
three-tier framework.48 Commentators choose among a 
wide array of disputes to justify their position—from 
Romer v. Evans,49 in which the Court “use[d] the 
heightened scrutiny mode of analysis when it claim[ed] to 
                                                                                                 
legislation in selecting and defining the appropriate tier.  Recent cases 
have made it clear that the Court covertly employs [this] approach in 
every equal protection challenge.”) 
46 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 34; WALTER F. MURPHY, 
THE ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). 
47 See, e.g., DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 
(2003); Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-
Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court: An Admiring 
Reply to Professor Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659 (2003); Frank B. 
Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 
YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Epstein & Knight, supra note 34; Tracey 
George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision 
Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992); Gerard S. Gryski et al., 
Models of State High Court Decision Making in Sex Discrimination 
Cases, 48 J. POL. 143; DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND 
AMERICAN LAW (2003); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, 
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). 
48 See supra note 47. 
49 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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be employing rational basis review;”50 to United States v. 
Virginia, in which the Court, at least according to Justice 
Scalia,51 applied strict (not heightened) scrutiny to assess a 
sex-based classification; to Grutter v. Bollinger,52 in which 
the Court applied strict scrutiny but nonetheless upheld the 
University of Michigan Law School’s use of race in 
admissions decisions. In short, because “the applicable 
level of scrutiny remains susceptible to modification—
either ratcheted up to the most demanding standard or 
reduced to the most permissive test”53—predictability is all 
but lost. 
Many scholars, perhaps the majority, take issue 
with the purported inconsistency as it pertains to the 
highest and lowest levels of the three-tier approach. As we 
foreshadowed in Part II A, they say, and have long said, 
that these two extreme tiers have “evolved sub silentio so 
that the highest level, strict scrutiny, equates to an almost 
automatic conclusion of unconstitutionality, and the lowest, 
rational basis review, leads to an equally likely result of 
constitutionality.”54 These analysts are aware of Romer and 
Grutter. They simply suggest that these cases are the 
exceptions to the general rule, as espoused by Gerald 
Gunther:  strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in 
fact,” while rational basis provides “minimal scrutiny in 
theory and virtually none in fact.”55 
While proponents of the three-tier approach differ 
with critics on the expectations created by the rational basis 
and strict scrutiny tests, there is virtually universal 
                                                 
50 Smith, supra note 3 at 476. 
51 See supra note 9.  Justice Scalia is not alone.  See supra note 8 
(scholarly works supporting Scalia’s contention). 
52 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
53 Melanie K. Morris, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Equality:  A 
Reassessment of Her Contribution, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 1, 20-
21. 
54 Bhagwat, supra note 43, at 270. 
55 Gunther, supra note 3, at 8. 
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agreement on the inherent unpredictability of the 
intermediate standard.  Or, as Joan Lukey puts it: 
 
Brennan’s language in Craig indicated that this 
new test was more than the rational basis 
standard, under which classifications were 
almost always upheld. Still, it fell short of the 
onus of the strict scrutiny standard, under which 
almost every classification was struck down.  It 
seemed that the concept of ‘intermediate 
scrutiny’ constituted a malleable, rather 
indetermi nate standard of review, providing 
little or no guidance for lower courts—or even 
for future Supreme Court cases.56   
 
Several members of the current Supreme Court agree.  
During his confirmation proceedings, Justice Souter 
declared that the intermediate scrutiny test “is not good, 
sound protection.  It is too loose.”57  Prior to joining the 
Court, Justice Ginsburg cautioned that “variance within the 
federal judiciary will persist until the High Court provides 
unequivocal guidance by designating sex as a suspect 
classification requiring the application of strict judicial 
scrutiny.”58  Dissenting in Craig, Justice Rehnquist asked:  
 
How is this Court to divine what objectives are 
important? How is it to determine whether a 
particular law is ‘substantially’ related to the 
achievement of such objective, rather than 
                                                 
56 Lukey, supra note 16, at 26.  See also Udell, supra note 13, at 547 
(arguing that “the Justices can draft such divergent opinions in their 
application of the intermediate scrutiny standard. . .”). 
57 Skaggs, supra note 7, at 1190.   
58 See Morris, supra note 53, at 21.  Ginsburg made this claim in Brief 
of Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 14, 
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (No. 79-381). 
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related in some other way to its achievement? 
Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and 
elastic as to invite subjective judicial 
preferences or prejudices relating to particular 
types of legislation, masquerading as judgments 
. . . .59 
 
Two of the Court’s most recent constitutional sex 
discrimination decisions illustrate these concerns.  In 
United States v. Virginia, the U.S. government implored the 
Court to apply strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications, 
an invitation that Justice Scalia, along with many scholars, 
contend the majority “effectively” accepted.60  
Nevertheless, in a scathing critique of intermediate 
scrutiny, Norman Deutsch writes that “[t]he shoe was on 
the other foot in the Court’s most recent gender case, 
Nguyen v. INS.”61  In the course of upholding the law at 
issue—one that privileges a mother over a father in 
citizenship proceedings—the Nguyen majority held that the 
sex-based classification achieved important government 
interests and passed the heightened scrutiny test.  Justice 
O’Connor disagreed.  In a vigorous dissent, she went so far 
as to accuse the Court of explaining and applying 
“heightened scrutiny. . . in a manner. . . that is a stranger to 
our precedents.”62  O’Connor went on to say that:  
 
No one should mistake the majority’s analysis 
for a careful application of this Court’s equal 
                                                 
59 Craig, 429 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
60 See supra note 9.  See also Delchin, supra note 8 (arguing that 
“while Justice Ginsburg never expressly referred to the Government’s 
argument in her majority opinion, several factors support Justice 
Scalia’s contention that the Court [adopted strict scrutiny]”); Sunstein, 
supra note 8. 
61 Deutsch, supra note 3, at 187. 
62 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74. 
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protection jurisprudence concerning sex-based 
classifications.  Today’s decision instead 
represents a deviation from a line of cases in 
which we have vigilantly applied heightened 
scrutiny to such classifications to determine 
whether a constitutional violation has occurred. 
I trust that the depth and vitality of these 
precedents will ensure that today’s error 
remains an aberration.63   
 
In short, O’Connor “not so subtly implied that the majority 
had, in effect, not applied intermediate scrutiny, but 
rational basis review.”64 
It is hardly a surprise that many scholars, regardless 
of what position they take over rational basis and strict 
scrutiny, have come to see that:   
 
[D]ispute over the proper application of the 
standard of review in Nguyen and Virginia is 
symptomatic of the fact that intermediate 
scrutiny is a ‘made up’ rule that has had little 
effect on the outcome of the decisions. . . . [I]n 
the end, the results in the cases turn on how the 
Court and the individual Justices view the 
underlying facts and policies, rather than on the 
verbalization of the standard of review as 
intermediate scrutiny.65 
  
If this is true, then as long as the Court continues to invoke 
the “murky” Craig rule, it will uphold or void 
classifications as it sees fit; and judges on state and lower 
federal courts will do the same or even “concoct” their own 
                                                 
63 Id. at 97. 
64 Deutsch, supra note 3 at 187. 
65 Id. at 187-88. 
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approaches to sex discrimination.66 As a result, all 
predictability, reliability, and consistency is lost. 
 
III. An Empirical Analysis of the Equal Protection Tests 
 
Several commentators dispute this view of 
intermediate scrutiny, claiming instead that its results are 
just as determinant as the rational basis and strict scrutiny 
tests.  Edward Gaffney is exemplary: “If the formal 
language of the standard used to evaluate claims of gender 
discrimination is not strict scrutiny, it is something very 
close to that sort of exacting review. It rarely meets a 
classification that it likes . . . ”67  while this claim may be 
relatively anomalous, as the discussion above indicates, it is 
nonetheless worthwhile to assess this claim against 
assertions flowing from more mainstream camps that the 
three-tier approach reveals either very little or a great deal 
about the likely outcomes of equal protection suits, with the 
notable exception of sex-discrimination litigation. 
Accordingly, in what follows we undertake this 
task.  In Part III A, we examine empirically the degree to 
which the highest and lowest tiers produce reliable 
outcomes: i.e., decisions upholding classifications under a 
rational basis analysis and decisions striking down 
classifications under strict scrutiny.  Then, in Part III B we 
explore the extent to which the intermediate test produces 
predictable results. 
In conducting these investigations, we focus 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., MEZEY, supra note 3; Brake, supra note 37; Roberta W. 
Francis, Reconstituting the Equal Rights Amendment: Policy 
Implications for Sex Discrimination, paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco 
(2001) (on file with the authors). 
67 Gaffney, supra note 12, at 396-97.  See also Bowsher, supra note 7 
at 317-18 (arguing that “despite the objections of three members of the 
Craig Court, intermediate scrutiny has since proven to be very 
workable”).   
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primarily on state courts of last resort (and then on sex-
discrimination litigation),68 even though the vast majority 
of commentary has centered on the U.S. Supreme Court.  
This focus reflects the difficulty of generalizing about the 
High Court’s adjudication of equal protection disputes from 
a small number of cases (e.g., since 1960, the Justices have 
decided only 30 sex discrimination cases implicating the 
Equal Protection Clause)69 and from a lack of variation in 
the standards employed (e.g., with the possible exception of 
United States v. Virginia, a majority of the Court has never 
applied strict scrutiny to sex-based claims)70. These 
difficulties evaporate when we move to state supreme 
courts.  Since 1960, state courts of last resort have 
addressed constitutional questions in 416 cases involving 
sex-based classifications, and they have done so using all 
three equal protection tests: rational basis, heightened 
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.71 
                                                 
68 Throughout this article we use the terms “state court of last resort” 
and “state supreme court” interchangeably, even though some state 
courts of last resort are not named “supreme court.” 
69 We obtained this figure from MEZEY, supra note 3, at 16, which lists 
the 29 cases decided between 1971 and 2001.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
Database identifies one case decided before 1971, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 
U.S. 57 (1961).  U.S. Supreme Court Database, at 
http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/databases.html (last accessed on 
January 1, 2003). 
70 In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), a plurality of four 
Justices deemed sex a suspect class.  But the four could not obtain a 
fifth vote, which led to the “compromise” in Craig.  See EPSTEIN & 
KNIGHT, supra note 34. 
71 The figure of 416—and all other data we present in this Article—
comes from a database we amassed on all constitutional sex 
discrimination cases resolved in state courts of last resort between 1960 
and 1999. Since that database (as well as all the documentation 
necessary to use it and an explanation of how we collected the 
information) is available on our web site, suffice it to note here that we 
included cases in which the state justices addressed a claim of 
constitutional sex discrimination and invoked an equal protection test in 
the course of addressing it.  See Table 1 and infra note 89;  see also 
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The use of different levels of scrutiny by state 
supreme courts with respect to the same class of disputes 
raises a number of interesting questions.  Most importantly, 
why do justices in one state invoke strict scrutiny, while 
those in another apply the intermediate standard?  On a 
somewhat different note, our attempt to gain insight into 
how the federal bench (especially the U.S. Supreme Court) 
employs the three-tier framework by focusing on the states 
and on sex discrimination raises a different set of questions.  
We address these matters in Part IV.  For now, let us turn to 
the results of our analyses of the various tiers 
encompassing the judiciary’s approach to equal protection. 
 
A.  Rational Basis and Strict Scrutiny 
 
Were we to focus our empirical investigation 
exclusively on the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of rational 
basis and strict scrutiny, it is entirely possible that we could 
muster support for virtually all existing commentary.  
Consider, for example, the conventional view that strict 
scrutiny and rational basis lead to predicable results.  Using 
the former, the Court strikes classification, while under the 
latter, it upholds them.  If we eliminate affirmative action 
cases from consideration,72 this conventional expectation 
seems to hold.  Since the 1960s, for example, it is difficult 
to identify a single act discriminating on the basis of race 
and challenged on equal protection grounds that the 
Justices upheld.  Conversely, it is equally difficult to 
identify a single law involving age discrimination that the 
Justices struck down as a violation of equal protection. 73 
                                                                                                 
infra note 90. 
72 We return to these cases momentarily. 
73 Using the U.S. Supreme Court Database (see supra note 69), we 
identified five age discrimination cases in the employment realm: 
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Alexander 
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The existence of successful challenges in the race 
area only and none involving age discrimination hardly 
seems a coincidence: the former are subject to strict 
scrutiny, and the latter to rational basis.  This distinction in 
standard may explain the results we observe.  The Court, in 
fact, suggested as much in the recent age discrimination 
case of Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents: 
 
States may discriminate on the basis of age 
without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if 
the age classification in question is rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.  The 
rationality commanded by the Equal Protection 
Clause does not require States to match age 
distinctions and the legitima te interests they 
serve with razorlike precision. . . . In contrast, 
when a State discriminates on the basis of race 
or gender, we require a tighter fit between the 
discriminatory means and the legitimate ends 
they serve. . . . Under the Fourteenth 
Amendme nt, a State may rely on age as a proxy 
for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics 
that are relevant to the State’s legitimate 
interests.  The Constitution does not preclude 
reliance on such generalizations.  That age 
proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any 
individual case is irrelevant. . . . Finally, because 
an age classification is presumptively rational, 
the individual challenging its constitutionality 
bears the burden of proving that the “facts on 
which the classification is apparently based 
could not reasonably be conceived to be true by 
                                                                                                 
v. Fioto, 430 U.S. 634 (1977); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).  In none of the five did the Court find in 
favor of the party alleging discrimination. 
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the governmental decisionmaker.”74  
 
If we incorporate affirmative action into our 
analysis, however, the picture changes dramatically, 
lending some support to those who proclaim the 
indeterminacy of even the highest level of scrutiny. Since 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke—75 the 
Court’s first major foray into the area of affirmative 
action—it has decided eight constitutional cases centering 
on preferences for minorities.76  Despite the Court’s use of 
the strict scrutiny standard to examine the programs at 
issue, it upheld four of the eight.77 
What should we take away from this analysis, as 
limited as it is, of the Supreme Court’s use of rational basis 
and strict scrutiny?  Not much, as it turns out.  Too few 
cases exist to reach any firm conclusions.  Furthermore, as 
we suggested earlier, once the Court uses a particular test to 
evaluate a particular type of classification, it generally stays 
the course.  The Court’s repeated application of rational 
basis in the age context is exemplary.  With the possible 
exception of United States v. Virginia, a majority of the 
Court has never applied strict scrutiny to a sex-based 
claim;78 and in only eight cases prior to Craig did it invoke 
the rational basis standard. 
                                                 
74 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-84 (citations omitted). 
75 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
76 We identified these cases using the U.S. Supreme Court Database.  
See supra note 69. 
77 The four it upheld were in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 
(1979); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Metro Broad., 
Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 124 S. Ct. 35 (2003). The four it struck were at issue in 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Richmond v. J. 
A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1988); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200 (1995); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003). 
78 As we noted supra at note 70, in Frontiero, a plurality, not a 
majority, of the Justices deemed sex a suspect class. 
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In an effort to overcome these problems, we turn to 
the states and, in particular, to how their courts of last 
resort have employed the two extreme levels of scrutiny to 
sex-based classifications.  Since 1960, these courts have 
resolved 416 constitutional sex discrimination suits.  As 
Figure 1 shows, minimal scrutiny is used in 45% (n=191), 
strict scrutiny in 18.0 % (n=75), and a version of the Craig 
intermediate standard in the remaining 150 (36.1%).79  This 
is quite a bit of inter-state variation in its own right, and it 
is especially noticeable when we compare it against the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s adjudication of sex-based 
discrimination cases.  Between 1960 and 2002, the Justices 
heard 30 cases, using the intermediate standard, or a variant 
thereof,80in nearly 70%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 For information on how we defined these standards, see infra note 
89. 
80 See supra note 35. 
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Figure 1: Use of equal protection tests in constitutional sex 
discrimination litigation in state courts of last resort. 
N=41681 
 
 
 
 
Let us consider the extent to which the upper and 
lower tiers produce reliable expectations about outcomes.  
Do courts invoking rational basis generally uphold 
classifications, while those employing strict scrutiny strike 
them down?  A simple comparison, as seen in Figure 2, 
suggests that the answer is yes.  The standard used by a 
court is, to a statistically significant degree,82 associated 
                                                 
81 See supra note 69 (information on the database we used to generate 
this figure); see also Table 1 and infra note 89 (how we defined these 
standards). 
82 The association is statistically significant (Chi-Square = 62.64; p < 
0.001). 
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with case outcomes.  Of the 191 suits in which the court 
applied rational basis, the party alleging discrimination 
failed to prevail in 81.2% (155 of 191); when the state 
justices invoked strict scrutiny (22 of 75) the losing 
percentage was only 18.8%. 83 
 
 
Figure 2: Prevailing party by the application of the rational 
basis and strict scrutiny tests in constitutional sex 
discrimination litigation in state courts of last resort. 
N=266.84 
 
 
                                                 
83 See infra note 90 (information on how we defined case outcomes). 
84 See supra note 69 (information on the database we used to generate 
this figure); see Table 1 and infra note 89 (how we defined these 
standards); see infra note 90 (how we treated case outcomes).  See also 
supra note 80 for information on statistical significance. 
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From Figure 2, we can say that standards and 
outcomes appear to be associated in ways that many 
commentators would anticipate.  Unfortunately, this sort of 
analysis does not enable us to make causal claims about 
that relationship; that is, from a simple comparison between 
standards and outcomes, we cannot claim that the standard 
employed caused the court to reach a particular outcome.  
There are many reasons for this, but most relevant here is 
that we have considered only the effect of the particular 
equal protection test on the case outcome and have failed to 
take into account other factors.  To the extent that we have 
ignored various competing explanations, our simple 
comparison suffers from the most severe form of “omitted 
variable bias,” making inferences reached therein suspect.85  
For example, if we believe that politics plays a role in 
explaining court decisions, then failure to address the 
political composition of the deciding court could lead to an 
incorrect assessment of the true jurisprudential effect of 
legal standards.86  Indeed, the impact of politics on judicial 
decision making could confound our results in any number 
                                                 
85 Epstein & King, supra note 41; GARY KING ET. AL., DESIGNING 
SOCIAL INQUIRY:  SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
(1994).  Omitted variable bias occurs when a statistical comparison 
excludes variables that are (a) known to affect the outcome and (b) 
correlate with the explanatory covariate of interest. 
86 For more than six decades, political scientists and legal academics 
have documented the effect of the political preferences of judges on the 
decisions they reach.  For recent examples, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED (2002); Theodore W. Ruger, et al., The Supreme 
Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to 
Predicting Supreme Court Decision-Making, COLUM . L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with authors).  See generally Lee 
Epstein et al., Childress Lecture Symposium: The Political (Science) 
Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783 (2003); works cited supra 
note 47.  
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of ways; for example, that only left-of-center courts invoke 
strict scrutiny or reach decisions in favor of the party 
alleging discrimination regardless of the standard 
employed. 
In light of the large amount of literature suggesting 
the importance of ideology, neither of these scenarios is 
much of a stretch.87 More generally, while there may be 
good reasons to believe that the adoption of a higher 
standard of law will generate outcomes more favorable to 
parties alleging discrimination, there are equally good 
reasons to question that assertion and believe that other 
factors come into play. At minimum, the conventional view 
about the determinacy of (the most extreme) tiers of the 
Court’s equal protection framework may ask too much of 
institutions. While rules certainly can serve to structure 
choices, it seems imprudent to believe that they do all the 
work—especially when so many studies of judging suggest 
otherwise. 
Accordingly, we must attend to (that is “control 
for”) the other factors that may affect case outcomes. 
Without performing statistical control, comparisons like 
Figure 2 are not informative about the possible causal 
relationships among the variables of interest.  Also, we 
ought to account for the possibility that the choice of which 
test to employ may be influenced by numerous factors.88  In 
                                                 
87 See supra note 84. 
88 To be sure, federal courts are supposed to adhere to legal principles 
established by the U.S. Supreme Court, and state courts are supposed to 
view federal law as establishing a floor, instead of a ceiling, on civil 
rights and liberties.  However, as the numerous studies, not to mention 
our own reading of state cases indicate, these norms do not always hold 
in this area of the law.  Commentators point to federal courts that have 
all but ignored the current intermediate standard and have instead 
invoked higher or lower rules as they so desire; they also point to state 
courts of last resort that used a rational basis standard to adjudicate sex 
discrimination even after Craig.  And, of course, there are states courts 
that treat sex as a suspect class. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 37; Branon 
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a previous analysis of the state sex discrimination data, we 
took these steps, estimating a statistical model that 
incorporated four factors (or “variables”) to explain the 
equal protection test used by the court89 and five factors, in 
addition to the test, to explain the outcome.90  To be even 
more precise, we analyzed two equations, with two 
differentially measured dependent variables—the test (an 
ordinal variable that can take on three values: rational basis, 
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny91) and the outcome 
                                                                                                 
P. Denning & John R. Vile, Necromancing the Equal Rights 
Amendment, 17 CONST. COMM. 593 (2000); Beth Gammie, State ERAs: 
Problems and Possibilities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1123 (1989); 
Kaufman, supra note 3; MEZEY, supra note 3; Kevin Francis O‘Neill, 
The Road Not Taken: State Constitutions as an Alternative Source of 
Protection for Reproductive Rights, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 5 
(1993).  See also Part IV, in which we examine factors explaining state 
courts’ choice of standard. 
89 These variables are as follows: (1) the presence or absence of a state 
equal rights amendment, (2) the political ideology of the court, (3) the 
proportion of the court composed of women, (4) the existence or not of 
a state intermediate appellate court, and (5) whether or not the state had 
ratified the national ERA.  See 
[http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html] (more details 
on these variables); see also Epstein et al., supra note 27 (the rationale 
behind including these variables). 
90 In addition to the equal protection test employed by the court, these 
variables are as follows: (1) the political ideology of the court, (2) the 
existence or not of a state intermediate appellate court, (3) a female as 
the party alleging discrimination, (4) a claim of a physical difference 
between men and women, and (5)  the government as a defender of the 
sex-based classification.  See 
[http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html] (more details 
on these variables); see also Epstein et al., supra note 27 (the rationale 
behind including these variables). 
the data and documentation on our web site; for the rationale behind 
including these variables, see Epstein et al., supra note 27. 
91 In the intermediate scrutiny category we also include a variation on 
that standard—that the government must offer an “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” for discriminating on the basis of sex—which 
some U.S. Supreme Court justices have endorsed. See supra note 35. In 
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(a dichotomous variable in which the court either ruled for 
or against the party alleging discrimination92)—in one 
model. Since no standard statistical model adequately 
performs this task, we developed one: a bivariate mixed 
response probit model, which allows for correlation across 
two equations and which we estimate using maximum 
likelihood.93 
                                                                                                 
the strict scrutiny category, we also include a standard invoked 
occasionally by a few state courts—a standard that some observers 
liken to strict scrutiny, while others describe as “stricter” than strict 
scrutiny because it supposedly does not allow for sex-based 
classifications. To the extent that courts qualify this “stricter” standard 
with terms such as “absent compelling justifications” or in cases based 
on “actual differences,” however, the prohibition is not absolute, 
thereby lending credence to the view that it is akin to strict scrutiny.  
For our purposes, though, the key point is that it is closer, if not 
identical, to strict scrutiny. 
92 To code case outcome, we rely on the approach commended by 
Gryski et al., supra note 47 and assess whether the party alleging sex 
discrimination won or lost the dispute. In taking this route, we are well 
aware of normative debates among some feminists over whether, as 
Goldstein, supra note 36, at 209, puts it, “to argue for ‘protective’ 
legislation for women on the grounds that without such legislation 
women are unfairly disadvantaged by making them play by rules that 
were designed with men in mind, and that are ill-adapted to women’s 
biology and life patterns.” While we appreciate this argument, our 
coding scheme remains relatively agnostic over it.  
93 See Epstein et al. supra note 27, at app. B (statistical model, along 
with our estimation methods). What is important here is that even 
though the parameter estimates resulting from these procedures admit 
to an interpretation akin to probit coefficients, our methodological 
approach is distinctive in two regards. First, it enables us to estimate 
parameters that, while substantively similar to those that would result 
from analyzing decisions over standards of law and case outcomes 
independently, are more efficient because we employ all the data to 
obtain them. Second, the approach facilitates a more exacting 
investigation of the dependence between the choices of standard and 
outcome because we are able to obtain a precise estimate of that 
dependence, in the form of an estimate of a correlation parameter, as a 
result of our ability to control for the factors that may affect both the 
standard and outcome in one model. Estimating this bivariate mixed 
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From this model, we gain a great deal of insight into 
the resolution of constitutional sex discrimination cases in 
the states.  For example, we can now account for why state 
courts adopt different standards of law to adjudicate the 
same class of cases.94 Furthermore, we can speak to the 
matter directly at hand: whether different equal protection 
tests lead to different results. The bivariate analysis 
presented in Figure 2 suggested that they do; and, as it turns 
out, this basic conclusion remains even after we control for 
the other relevant factors. 
In particular, from our analyses, we find that the 
standard a court uses and the outcome it reaches are 
significantly correlated95—in the direction many 
                                                                                                 
response probit model leads to the results depicted in the table below—
results that are quite striking: All the variables produce statistically 
significant coefficients in the expected direction. The estimate, 
indicating the correlation between the equal protection test used and the 
outcome reached, also attains statistical significance. 
 
 
 
Maximum likelihood estimates and (asymptotic) standard errors for the 
bivariate mixed response probit model fit to the constitutional sex 
discrimination data. N = 416. lnL = -593.0884. * denotes statistical 
significance (?  = 0.05.)  See supra note 87 and supra note 88 
(information on the variables used in this model). 
94 We describe these results later in Part IV, in which we explore the 
implications of our study. 
95 See the    coefficient in the table presented in note 91 supra. 
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commentators would anticipate. Moreover, the probabilities 
displayed in Figure 3 reveal that the relationship is 
substantively meaningful as well. Consider the two curves 
at the extreme right (representing rational basis) and the 
extreme left (strict scrutiny) of the figure, and notice the 
monotonic increase in the odds, such that when courts 
assess sex classifications via a rational basis test—the 
lowest level of scrutiny—the likelihood of finding in favor 
of the equality claim is just .20. That probability increases 
to a rather large .73 when they invoke strict scrutiny.  In 
other words, and inline with much extant commentary, 
application of the lowest and highest standards leads to 
rather predictable outcomes—though in opposing 
directions: claims of sex discrimination will, on average, 
fail under a rational basis standard, and in all likelihood 
prevail under strict scrutiny. 
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Figure 3: Kernel density estimates of probabilities of an 
outcome favoring the litigant alleging sex discrimination 
given the rational basis standard (the left-most dashed line), 
the intermediate standard (the middle dashed line), and the 
strict scrutiny standard (the solid line).96 
 
 
 
B. Heightened Scrutiny 
 
What our analysis thus far reveals is that state court 
adjudication of sex discrimination cases fits conventional 
views about the predictability of results yielded by rational 
basis and strict scrutiny approaches to equal protection. But 
what of the in-between tier—a tier that many, if not most, 
scholars suggest can lead to unexpected results?  Are the 
outcomes as unpredictable as so many commentators 
                                                 
96 These estimates account for all parameter uncertainty and were 
constructed from the simulation outlined in Epstein et al. supra note 27, 
at app. B. All covariates are held at their sample means. See supra note 
69 (information on the database we used to generate this figure); Table 
1 and supra note 89 (how we defined these standards); supra note 90 
(how we treated case outcomes). 
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assert? 
The middle curve displayed in Figure 3 (which 
represents heightened scrutiny) begins to provide an 
answer, and it is in the affirmative: When courts apply the 
intermediate standard, the probability that a litigant alleging 
discrimination will prevail is 47%.  Just as many scholars 
would expect, under mid-level scrutiny litigants claiming 
sex discrimination are nearly as likely to win as they are to 
lose.  This is in contrast to the relatively predictable 
outcomes generated by rational basis (under which a 
litigant faces only 20% likelihood of winning) and strict 
scrutiny (with a 73% probability of success). 
Further analyses of the data do little to change the 
basic conclusion about the predictability—or, more 
pointedly, lack thereof—of the intermediate standard.  For 
example, if we focus exclusively on the 150 cases in which 
state courts invoked this approach, we find once again, as 
Figure 4 shows, that parties alleging sex discrimination lost 
nearly as often as they prevailed (46.7% versus 53.3%). 
Moreover, the outcomes in the 150 cases are themselves 
somewhat difficult to predict. From analyses designed to 
take into account the multitude of factors that may affect 
court decisions, we were able to identify only a few that 
were substantively significant predictors. One, notably, was 
the ideology of the state justices deciding the dispute: the 
more left-of-center (“liberal”) the court, the more likely it 
was to apply intermediate scrutiny in a way favorable to the 
party alleging discrimination. Our model suggests that the 
most conservative court would find for the plaintiff alleging 
sex discrimination in only 26.1 % of the cases, while the 
most liberal court would do so in 70.9%.  The government 
also plays an influential role.  When it was the party 
defending discrimination, the court was far more likely to 
uphold the challenged classification (65.4% versus 
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33.0%).97 
 
Figure 4: Prevailing party by application of equal 
protection tests in constitutional sex discrimination 
litigation in state courts of last resort.  N=416.98 
 
 
 
What these analyses tell us is that even after 
controlling for a range of relevant factors, a good deal of 
uncertainty remains about the conclusions state justices 
reach in constitutional sex discrimination disputes when 
they apply intermediate scrutiny—and those factors that 
                                                 
97 We performed this analysis using a CLARIFY-like simulation.  See 
infra note 109. The data and documentation necessary to reproduce 
these results are available on our web site. 
98 See supra note 69 (information on the database we used to generate 
this figure); Table 1 and supra note 89 (how we defined these 
standards); supra note 90 (how we treated case outcomes). 
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eliminate some of that uncertainty appear more related to 
politics than to the legal standard.  If we move to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, however, even this degree of predictability 
vanishes.  Since Craig, the justices have resolved 20 
constitutional sex equality cases on equal protection 
grounds,99 with the party alleging discrimination prevailing 
in fewer than half (nine out of 20, or 45%).  While there 
may be some underlying explanation(s) to account for these 
outcomes, we were not able to identify a single one.100  The 
Court does not seem to differentiate cases on the basis of 
whether a female litigant brought the claim, as some 
scholars have suggested;101 and it is not particularly 
deferential to the federal government (or the states, for that 
matter) when it attempts to defend a sex-based 
classification.  Nor does the political ideology of the 
justices seem to exert much impact on their resolution of 
these cases.  Though given the small number of cases we 
do not want to make too much of these findings, the latter 
is especially surprising in light of the large number of 
empirical studies ascribing a significant role for ideology in 
Court decision-making.102 
 
IV.  Implications of the Analysis for Discrimination 
Based on Sex and Sexual Orientation 
 
                                                 
99 See MEZEY, supra note 3. 
100 We considered four basic variables (under different measurements 
and specification): the ideology of the court, the presence or absence of 
women justices, whether a woman was claiming discrimination, and 
whether a government defended a sex-based classification. We 
measured the Court’s ideology using the Segal & Cover scores. See 
Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes 
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989).  See 
[http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html] (data and 
documentation necessary to reproduce these analyses). 
101 See Baer, supra note 40. 
102 See, e.g., studies cited in supra note 47 and supra note 84. 
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Given the results of our analyses, it would be 
difficult to take issue with Andrew Koppelman’s 
conclusion about intermediate scrutiny.  Even though he 
advocates treating laws that discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation as sex discrimination for purposes of 
equal protection analysis,103 he recognizes that the sex 
discrimination argument is not free from indeterminacy.  
The question inevitably arises as to whether the state can 
offer an adequate justification for what it has done, and 
then a court must balance the interests involved in a way 
that will unavoidably allow for judicial discretion.104 
Our findings about the apparent indeterminacy of 
heightened scrutiny, not to mention our results reinforcing 
the relative predictability of rational basis and strict 
scrutiny, may lend support to Koppelman’s conclusion.  
But what lessons should we take from our study?  We see 
two as particularly important, one pertaining to the future 
of sex discrimination litigation, and the other, to the 
advancement of legal rights for gays. 
We take up both in what follows.  But before doing 
so, an important cautionary note is in order: Because we 
largely base these implications on analyses of state court 
decisions, we cannot state with any certainty the extent to 
which they transport to all American courts.  More 
pointedly, using knowledge that we have gained from 
investigations of state cases to make inferences about 
federal litigation is a risky business indeed.  The types of 
suits may differ,105 as well as the parties,106 to name just 
two points of distinction.  Nonetheless, in light of the 
severe problems of addressing debates over equal 
                                                 
103 See Koppelman, supra note 14. 
104 Id. at 535-36. 
105 For example, state courts typically do not resolve questions 
concerning federal immigration law or the military draft. 
106 For example, the U.S. government was not a participant in any of 
the 416 state cases in our database. 
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protection with reference only to federal courts, the state 
judiciary provides an antidote.  For example, only by 
looking to the states—some of which have invoked strict 
scrutiny to resolve sex discrimination suits—were we able 
to get a handle on the counterfactual world: one in which 
federal courts deem sex a suspect class.  And only by 
looking to the states, as we explain below, are we able to 
isolate those factors that could move sex-based litigation 
from the counterfactual to the factual: from a federal 
judiciary that now applies the intermediate standard to one 
that instead employs strict scrutiny. 
 
A. Sex Discrimination Litigation 
 
Throughout this article we have noted various 
expressions of dissatisfaction with intermediate scrutiny.  
While the critiques are many in number, one standing 
above virtually all others is the test’s indeterminacy.  From 
the vantage point of equality, the in-between approach may 
generate “better” outcomes than the traditional rational 
basis standard but it is highly unpredictable in application. 
Our study confirms the veracity of this critique.  As 
Figure 3 makes clear, if we believe it is desirable for courts 
to produce a larger number of equality-oriented outcomes, 
then heightened scrutiny better serves that objective than 
rational basis.  Controlling for a host of other relevant 
factors, litigants challenging sex-based classifications are 
more than twice as likely to prevail now than they were 
prior to Craig.  On the other hand, their odds, even under 
the intermediate test, are no better than 50-50, a far cry 
from the likelihood of victory under strict scrutiny—73%. 
What these results underscore is a claim that 
advocates for women’s rights have long made: the 
importance of elevating sex to a suspect class.107 Until the 
                                                 
107 See, e.g., MEZEY, supra note 3; Brake, supra note 37; Francis, supra 
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Supreme Court takes this step, federal courts will continue 
to employ the amorphous intermediate rule, sometimes 
upholding sex-based classification and sometimes voiding 
them—with little predictability. 
On this much many agree.  The question, of course, 
is how to alter the current standard.  Our investigation into 
why state tribunals apply the equal protection tests supplies 
two answers. One is the existence of an equal rights 
amendment; the other is the presence of women on the 
bench. 
 
1. Equal Rights Amendments (ERA) 
 
Beginning with an ERA, scholars have long argued 
that the adoption of a federal ERA will force jurists to 
elevate sex to a suspect class, which in turn will lead them 
to eradicate virtually all sex-based classifications, as they 
now do in the case of race.108 
                                                                                                 
note 64.  See also infra note 108. 
108 Elevating sex to a suspect class was a primary motivation for the 
drive for (and against) the ERA in the 1970s.  See, e .g., WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 
(1997); HERMA H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION:  TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1988); Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the 
Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, 
Sunstein & Tushnet’s Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 
(1989); Brown, supra note 28; Mary Anne Case, Reflections on 
Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 765 (2002); 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Equal Rights Amendment is the Way, 1 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19 (1978); Kaufman, supra note 3; Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (1987); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 735 (2002); Francis, supra note 66; Note, Sex 
Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional 
Amendment, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499 (1971).  On other hand, some 
scholars argue that a formal rule, such as an ERA, will not effectively 
end the subordination of women by men at least in part because of the 
prevalence of male dominance in most facets of social, political and 
economic life.  We do not attempt to assess this position, but our 
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Our exploration of the standards used in sex-based 
discrimination cases supplies some confirmation of the 
importance of an equal rights amendment, which over one-
third of the states have now incorporated into their 
constitutions—with many containing similar language and 
purporting to carry analogous objectives as the federal 
ERA.109  What we find, after controlling for all other 
relevant factors,110 is that the presence of an ERA 
significantly increases the odds of a court adopting a higher 
equal protection test.  Specifically, when we set all other 
variables at their mean, the likelihood, on average, of a 
court invoking strict scrutiny to adjudicate a sex-based 
claim is just 11% in the absence of an ERA.  That 
probability doubles to 23% when an ERA is in effect. 
Of course, because this figure of .23 is relatively 
distant from 1.00, it is far from certain that an ERA will 
assure the application of strict scrutiny.  But it does raise 
the probability of state jurists taking that step—and it may 
very well have the same effect on U.S. Supreme Court 
justices.  In fact, in the early 1970s several declined to 
elevate sex to a suspect class at least in part because they 
thought it “inappropriate to ‘amend’ the Constitution while 
the ERA was pending.”111  
                                                                                                 
analysis does lend support to the claims of others who argue that formal 
equality provisions are not always inefficacious, but rather their 
effectiveness depends a good deal on who is interpreting them.  
Specifically, to foreshadow our results, we find that as the fraction of 
women serving on a state supreme court increases, the likelihood of the 
court adopting a higher standard of law also increases—and 
significantly increases at that.  See Part IV. 
109 See, e.g., Susan Crump, An Overview of the Equal Rights 
Amendment in Texas, 11 HOUS. L. REV. 136 (1973); Andrea J. Farone, 
The Florida Equal Rights Amendment: Raising the Standard Applied to 
Gender Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution, 
1 FL. COASTAL L.J. 421 (2000). 
110 See supra note 91. 
111 ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 108, at 78; see also Ginsburg, 
supra note 108. 
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The Court’s declination came at a time when the 
ERA’s passage looked promising.  What about now, some 
thirty years later?  What are the odds of adding an ERA to 
the U.S. Constitution?  Addressing this question is beyond 
the scope of this article so we will only note here that, 
despite pronouncements in the 1980s to the contrary, the 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) may not be dead.  
Actually, there are signs that the battle may be heating up 
yet again.112  For example, the “three-state” strategy 
deployed by organized interests in response to claims 
appearing in scholarly journals, policy memoranda, and the 
press that ratification of the 27th Amendment in 1992—
over 200 years after it was proposed—may hold 
implications, if not promise, for the ERA.113  To be sure, 
this “reconstituted” drive for the ERA has generated 
substantial opposition (especially from Phyllis Schlafly and 
her Eagle Forum), but it may very well succeed in Illinois, 
where in 2003 65% of voters supported ratification and 
only 19% did not (17% had no opinion).114  Another sign is 
the increasing importance attached to the Amendment in 
academic and media treatments.  By way of illustration, 
consider that in the first six months of 1993, just 186 news 
articles made mention of the ERA.  For the same period in 
2003, the number of news articles that mentioned the ERA 
was more than double (N=471) the amount of the 
corresponding period in 1993.115  Yet a final indication of 
the rising importance of the ERA comes from legal 
commentators.  A passage from Judge Martha Daughtrey’s 
                                                 
112 Epstein et al., supra note 27. 
113 See, e.g., Denning & Vile, supra note 88.  But see Georgia Duerst-
Lahti, Time To Ratify the Equal Rights Amendment, NEWSDAY, May 
20, 2003, at A30; Ellen Goodman, Equal Rights Amendment is Not 
Dead Yet, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 21, 2000, at B5.   
114 Christi Parsons, Not So Controversial to Voters: Poll Says Many 
Back Gay Rights, ERA, Gun Limits, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 2003, at C1. 
115 We obtained these figures from a LEXIS search (in the news group 
file) on the term “Equal Rights Amendment.” 
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Madison Lecture, delivered at New York University, 
provides but one example: 
 
In the course of cleaning out closets 
and drawers that had collected much too 
much stuff over a dozen years, I found this 
political button, brought home—as I 
recall—from an ABA meeting some years 
ago.  It reads: “Happy Birthday E.R.A. 
1923-1993, You Are Long Overdue!” 
About the same time that I found the 
button, the ABA Journal published a cover 
story on the renewed efforts to amend the 
United States Constitution to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of gender.  As it 
turns out, the Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA) which, if ratified, would have 
become the twenty-seventh amendment to 
the Federal Constitution—but which “died” 
for lack of ratification by three additional 
states in 1982—has been reintroduced in the 
current session of Congress.  The prospect 
of a renewed effort to pass the ERA in 
Congress and to mount ratification 
campaigns in the fifty state legislatures 
raises a number of questions that I would 
like to explore with you this evening.116 
 
Whether the “renewed effort” of which Judge Daughtrey 
speaks will succeed we cannot say.  What does seem to be 
the case is that the bulk of contemporary commentary now 
suggests that the ERA may be as dead as the 19th 
Amendment, which took over 40 years to gain 
                                                 
116 Daughtrey, supra note 6, at 2-3 (citations omitted). 
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1] 
 
58 
ratification.117 
 
2. Women on the Bench 
 
Certainly our results indicate that ERAs are 
important components in the quest for the eradication of 
sex-based discrimination because they increase the 
probability of a court applying a higher standard of law to 
adjudicate claims of sex discrimination.  Furthermore, the 
application of a higher standard of law, even after 
controlling for other relevant factors, increases the 
probability of a court reaching a disposition favorable to 
litigants alleging a violation of their rights. 
An ERA is not, however, the only factor that lifts 
the odds of the adoption of strict scrutiny.  As some 
scholars have long speculated, the proportion of women on 
the deciding court also exerts a statistically significant 
effect.118  As that proportion increases, the probability of 
                                                 
117 See Francis, supra note 66 (parallels between the campaigns for 
ratification of the 19th Amendment and the ERA). 
118 Virtually from the day Suzanna Sherry penned her classic work 
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 
VA. L. REV. 543 (1986) on the possibility of a “feminine” 
jurisprudence, scholars have hotly debated whether female judges 
“speak in a different voice.”  For recent reviews of this literature, see 
Herma Hill Kay & Geraldine Sparrow, Workshop on Judging: Does 
Gender Make a Difference?, 16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2001); Daniel 
M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory 
Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325 (2001).  
While the results of various research projects exploring whether male 
and female judges vote differently reach decidedly mixed results, those 
centering on jurisprudence (Sherry’s original target)—especially in the 
area of sex discrimination—are clearer.  A consensus now exists that 
women have “pushed the law forward in sex discrimination cases” with 
their distinct approach to legal principles possibly altering the choices 
made by their male colleagues.   Kay & Sparrow, at 11.   See, e.g., 
Sherry; Sullivan, supra note 106.  Our study lends empirical support to 
this growing consensus.  At minimum, it seems rather clear that the 
presence of women on state judiciaries exerts an influence on how 
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applying a higher standard of law soars even after 
controlling for the presence (or absence) of an ERA. 
 To see the magnitude of the effect, consider a court 
composed exclusively of male justices.  On average, the 
odds of that court using a rational basis standard, setting all 
other variables at their mean, is a hefty .50; the probability 
of that same court applying strict scrutiny is but .12.  Now 
consider a court nearly equally divided between male and 
female judges: the probabilities nearly reverse.  The odds of 
this court applying rational basis are, on average, but 14% 
while the probability for strict scrutiny jumps to 47%. 
This result commends a rather pointed strategy for 
those seeking more equality-oriented outcomes in court 
cases, a campaign designed to bring more women to the 
federal judiciary.  Surely the ultimate target would be the 
U.S. Supreme Court: with one more favorably disposed 
justice, a majority supporting strict scrutiny could 
emerge.119  Of course, history shows that the new justice 
need not be a woman; after all, it was William J. Brennan 
who was among the first to urge his colleagues to elevate 
sex to a suspect class.120  On the other hand, it is perhaps no 
coincidence that it is Justices O’Connor121 and Ginsburg122 
who continue to push the United States v. Virginia 
standard—a standard some say is more akin to strict 
                                                                                                 
courts adjudicate sex-based claims. 
119 This assumes that the four dissenters in Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), 
the Court’s most recent sex-discrimination case, who invoked the 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” of the VMI case to support their 
views, would be willing to elevate sex to a suspect class.  Surely this is 
true of Justice Ginsburg, who may have viewed VMI as the first step in 
that direction.  See Skaggs, supra note 7; Stobaugh, supra note 8; 
Morris, supra note 53.  It is not so clear that Justices Breyer, O’Connor, 
and Souter viewed the VMI case in the same way. 
120 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 677 (Brennan’s judgment for the Court). 
121 See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74 (O’Connor’s dissent). 
122 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 588 U.S. at 519 (Ginsburg 
writing the majority opinion of the Court). 
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scrutiny than it is to Craig.123 
Nonetheless, however important the U.S. Supreme 
Court, ignoring the lower appellate bench in any campaign 
designed to increase the number of female judges would be 
                                                 
123 See supra note 8; supra note 9. See also Linda Greenhouse, From 
the High Court, A Voice Quite Distinctly a Woman’s, N.Y. TIMES, May 
26, 1999, at A1.  Greenhouse writes that Ginsburg: 
 
 recounted in a 1997 speech to the Women’s Bar 
Association . . . that a year earlier, as she  announced 
her opinion declaring unconstitutional the all-male 
admissions policy at the Virginia Military Institute, 
she looked across the bench at Justice O’Connor and 
thought of the legacy they were building together.  
  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in the Virginia 
case cited one of Justice O’Connor’s earliest majority 
opinions for the Court, a 1982 decision called 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan that 
declared unconstitutional the exclusion of male 
students from a state-supported nursing school.  
Justice O’Connor, warning against using “archaic 
and stereotypic notions” about the roles of men and 
women, herself cited in that opinion some of the 
Supreme Court cases that Ruth Ginsburg, who was 
not to join the Court for another 11 years, had argued 
and won as a noted women’s rights advocate during 
the 1970’s.  
  Addressing the women’s bar group, Justice 
Ginsburg noted that the vote in Justice O’Connor’s 
1982 opinion was 5 to 4, while the vote to strike 
down men-only admissions in Virginia 14 years later 
was 7 to 1.  
  “What occurred in the intervening years in 
the Court, as elsewhere in society?” Justice Ginsburg 
asked.  The answer, she continued, lay in a line from 
Shakespeare that Justice O’Connor had recently 
spoken in the character of Isabel, Queen of France, in 
a local production of “Henry V”: “Haply a woman’s 
voice may do some good.” 
 
See also Daughtrey, supra note 6, at 21-22. 
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in error.  Since change from the “bottom up” is not 
unknown in American legal history,124 it is always possible 
that women serving in the circuits could exert “hydraulic 
pressure” on the Supreme Court, forcing it reevaluate its 
current standard.125  Yet, at the time of this writing, less 
                                                 
124 An interesting example along these lines comes from early legal 
debates over how to define obscenity.  While the U.S. Supreme Court 
until the 1950s clung to a highly restrictive definition developed in the 
British case of Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), the lower 
federal courts were liberalizing or even rejecting that definition.  
Among the most prominent examplars is Judge Augustus Hand’s 
opinion in United States v. One Book Entitled “Ulysses” by James 
Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (1934).  See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 
359-60. 
125 In the legal annals, the term “hydraulic pressure” (usually associated 
with public pressure on the Court) has taken on a negative connotation 
owing to its use by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Northern Securities 
Company v. United States:  
 
Great cases like hard cases make bad law.  
For great cases are called great, not by 
reason of their real importance in shaping 
the law of the future, but because of some 
accident of immediate overwhelming 
interest which appeals to the feelings and 
distorts the judgment.  These immediate 
interests exercise a kind of hydraulic 
pressure which makes what previously was 
clear seem doubtful, and before which even 
well settled principles of law will bend. 
193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1903).  See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 405 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The ‘hydraulic pressure[s]’ 
that Holmes spoke of as being generated by cases of great import have 
propelled the Court to go beyond the limits of judicial power, while 
fortunately leaving some room for legislative judgment.”); Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 867 (1991) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“The 
great tragedy of the decision, however, is the danger that the “hydraulic 
pressure” of public opinion that Justice Holmes once described—and 
that properly influences the deliberations of democratic legislatures  
. . . .”); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 505 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Well-settled principles of law are bent 
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than 25% of the seats on the federal circuit courts are 
occupied by female judges (32 of 134),126 meaning that the 
odds of attaining a panel with two women, much less three, 
are rather small— and, for some circuits, border on trivial, 
as Table 2 indicates.  A strategy aimed at increasing these 
figures, if successful and if our analysis of the state courts 
transports to the federal judiciary, would likely help, and 
not impede, the goal of elevating sex to a suspect class. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
today by the Court under that kind of ‘hydraulic pressure.’”).  But 
pressure can, of course, come from sources other than public opinion, 
and it is equally as certain that pressure to change problematic 
principles of law, even if well-settled, is hardly the tragedy that some of 
these statements suggest. 
126 Data are available at 
http://www.allianceforjustice.org/judicial/judicial_selection_resources/
selection_database/activejudges.asp (last accessed on December 31, 
2003). 
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Table 2: The gender composition of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals.  Each cell represents the probability of panel 
composed of a particular combination of male (M) and 
female (F) judges across the appellate courts, assuming 
random assignment of three-judge panels.127 
 
 
 
 
B. Discrimination Against Gays and Lesbians 
 
In an effort to eradicate discrimination against gays 
and lesbians, commentators have proposed a number of 
doctrinal avenues.128  One, the Due Process Clause, proved 
                                                 
127 The data on gender composition are as of January 1, 2003 (derived 
from 
http://www.allianceforjustice.org/judicial/judicial_selection_resources/
selection_database/activejudges.asp and do not include vacancies.  
Assuming random assignment of federal appellate judges to panels, we 
calculated the probabilities in accord with simple probability rules.  See 
generally SHELDON ROSS, A FIRST COURSE IN PROBABILITY 24-63 (6th 
ed. 2002). 
128 For reviews, see ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 108; Massaro, 
supra note 14; ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN 
AMERICAN LAW (2002).  For a critique of many of these arguments, see 
Cass Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1 
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successful in Lawrence v. Texas.129  That has not, however, 
diminished the importance of equal protection in the battle 
to eradicate classifications based on sexual orientation. 130 
Along these lines, scholars have suggested two 
chief courses of action.  Some urge the application of 
heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate between 
homosexuals and heterosexuals, that is, these commentators 
“seek to garner intermediate scrutiny for gays as gays.”131  
Another group suggests that discrimination against gays 
and lesbians is, in fact, discrimination based on sex.  
Hence, courts should apply the same level of scrutiny to 
classifications based on sexual orientation as they now do 
for laws that amount to sex discrimination. 132 
                                                                                                 
(1994); but see Massaro’s cogent response, supra note 14. 
129 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472.  But see Post, supra note 24.  Post 
claims that passages in the opinion are framed in the language of equal 
protection.  Indeed, the Court itself seemed to “meld” equal protection 
and due process when it wrote that “[e]quality of treatment and the due 
process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the 
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects,” 
though it added that “a decision on the latter point advances both 
interests.”  123 S.Ct. at 2482. 
130  See Massaro supra note 14; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE 
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996). 
131 See Yoshino, supra note 14; Shalleck, supra note 14.  See generally 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).  Along similar 
lines, some scholars and judges have proposed applying strict scrutiny 
to discrimination based on sexual orientation.  See, e.g., Watkins v. 
U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Renee Culverhouse & 
Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 
205 (1993); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: 
Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285. 
Our analysis below speaks to this proposal as well. 
132 See Clausen, supra note 14; Koppelman, supra note 14; Law, supra 
note 14; Massaro, supra note 14; Pharr, supra note 14.  See also 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 130, at 162 (noting that in Baehr v. Lewin, the 
court adopted the argument that “the state’s refusal to give marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples is sex discrimination . . . [T]he Hawaii 
court made the right decision.”). 
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This last argument has some appeal: if courts treat 
sex as a suspect class and if they place discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation under the rubric of sex 
discrimination, then the odds are high of eradicating 
whatever classification is at issue.  This is the central 
message of our study; and it is the lesson of Baehr v. 
Lewin, as well.133  In that case, the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii treated the denial of same-sex marriages as sex 
discrimination and applied strict scrutiny—the standard it 
uses, owing to the presence of state ERA, to assess sex-
based classifications.  But the argument for treating 
discrimination against gays and lesbians as sex 
discrimination— as well as, of course, proposals seeking to 
“garner intermediate scrutiny for gays as gays”—loses 
some of its appeal in the current federal context, as well as 
in most states.  In those arenas, sex is not treated as a 
suspect class, but subject to intermediate scrutiny, which, 
as we have demonstrated throughout, is far less likely to 
lead to equality-oriented outcomes. 
This demonstration, however, is not meant to 
suggest that advocates for gay rights should eschew an 
equal protection strategy designed to attain heightened 
constitutional scrutiny.  Actually, we, along with many 
legal scholars, see benefits to this approach—some of 
which are symbolic, but others, quite practical.  For one 
thing, as our data suggest, moving from rational basis to 
intermediate scrutiny will, in all likelihood, further the 
cause of gay rights.  Indeed, if the results presented here 
generalize across the judiciary and transport from sex 
discrimination to sexual orientation, the probability of 
success in court will double.  For another, as Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg points out, the elevation of sex from rational basis 
to heightened scrutiny has had salutary effects that 
transcend the courtroom:  
                                                 
133 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1] 
 
66 
 
        The Supreme Court, since the 1970s, has 
effectively carried on in the gender 
discrimination cases a dialogue with the 
political branches of government.  The Court 
wrote modestly, it put forth no grand 
philosophy.  But by forcing legislative and 
executive branch re-examination of sex-based 
classifications, the Court helped to ensure that 
laws and regulations would catch up with a 
changed world.134 
 
On the other hand, there are costs associated with 
the strategic pursuit of heightened scrutiny in the name of 
advancing the legal rights of gays.  Primarily, if courts 
began to apply the mid-level test to classifications based on 
sexual orientation—either by treating them as a separate 
class or folding them into sex discrimination—they would, 
in all likelihood, abide by that standard for the foreseeable 
future if constitutional sex discrimination litigation is any 
indication.  To see this danger, we need only to recall that 
the test established in Craig nearly 30 years ago remains 
the test that the Court applies today despite efforts on the 
part of Justice Ginsburg and others to “ratchet it up.”135 
That principles of law endure is no great surprise.  
As we noted earlier,136 if courts do not follow previously 
established rules of law, or do so in unpredictable ways, 
they risk undermining their fundamental efficacy, for 
members of legal and political communities base their 
future expectations on the belief that others will follow 
existing rules.  However, this phenomenon does not appear 
                                                 
134 Ruth B. Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States 
as a Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under 
the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 270 (1997). 
135 See supra note 6. 
136 See supra note 42. 
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to be the case with regard to Craig, which has generated 
unpredictable results in the sex discrimination area and may 
very well do the same in constitutional cases centering on 
sexual orientation.  Advocates for gay rights can expect, if 
our results are any indication, to lose as many cases as they 
win, with the equal protection test itself providing little 
guidance to differentiate between the two. 
By explicating these problems, we emphasize once 
again that our goal is not to deter advocates from following 
the equal protection path (especially in the event of the 
Court elevating sex to a suspect class).  It is rather to 
persuade members of the legal community to undertake an 
analysis of its particularcosts and benefits—whether with 
our data or with other, more tailored observations. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
For nearly thirty years now, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has employed a “heightened scrutiny” test to adjudicate 
constitutional claims of sex discrimination.  While some 
commentators endorse this approach, far more have 
questioned it.  Their critiques are varied in message and 
many in number, but chief among them is the test’s 
seeming lack of determinacy: because the test is so 
“amorphous” it fails to establish reliable expectations about 
the results of sex-discrimination litigation. 
Our empirical results put this normative critique on 
stronger footing.  We find that when courts apply the 
intermediate standard, litigants alleging sex discrimination 
are nearly as likely to win as they are to lose.  This finding 
is in marked contrast to the relatively predicable outcomes 
generated when courts apply strict scrutiny, under which 
most parties challenging sex-based classifications prevail. 
For those desiring a larger number of equality-
oriented outcomes, the task is to convince courts to elevate 
sex to a suspect class.  We supplied several strategies for 
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accomplishing this objective, and surely others exist.  Until 
one or more succeeds, however, Ginsburg’s cautionary 
remark of two decades ago remains apt: “variance,” and not 
uniformity, “within the federal judiciary will persist.”137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
137 Ginsburg, supra note 58. 
